On July 26, the 25th anniversary of the Kargil war, Prime Minister Narendra Modi led the nation in paying tribute to the brave hearts, who displayed extraordinary valour in the face of enormous tactical difficulties posed by the craggy Himalayan topography to safeguard the country’s sovereignty. The choice of Dras in the Himalayan heights was appropriate for this solemn occasion.
Whether the Kargil war of mid-1999 was a victory or a case of the armed forces evicting Pakistani troops from Indian territory at a high human cost is a matter of debate. However, PM Modi highlighted a very important aspect of that war. “In Kargil, we not only won the war, we also presented an incredible example of truth, restraint and strength,” he said. The endeavour was helmed by then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who headed the first BJP-led NDA government, and the then National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra.
The Kargil war has several distinctive facets, each of which merits detailed discussion, but some aspects are particularly important. In the post-Cold War period, this was the first such exigency in which two states with nuclear weapons capability, also proximate neighbours, were engaged in a limited but intense conventional war over territory.
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Despite some f*ckless sabre-rattling by Pakistani diplomats at the UN in the early stages of the war, in hindsight, it is evident that both sides exercised nuclear restraint and the apocalyptic escalation that was feared did not occur. PM Vajpayee arrived at a very prudent politico-military decision: India will evict the intruders even if at high human cost but would not cross the Line of Control and take the war into Pakistan. This reassured the global community that the Kargil war had a limited military objective.
Kargil was also the first televised war in India, and this added to citizen awareness and emotive nationalism – Captain Vikram Batra’s battle cry “Yeh Dil Mange More” is now part of collective memory. But Kargil@25 is also an opportune moment to reflect on major omissions and inadequacies. Here, the military and intelligence domains merit scrutiny.
Over the years, a reasonable body of information detailing the fine print of the Kargil war has accumulated. In hindsight, it may be averred that inter-service cooperation and the spirit of jointness, particularly between the Army and the Air Force, left much to be desired. The numerous first-person accounts testify to such failures and more.
From Pakistan’s perspective, Kargil was a gamble, secretly planned by General Musharraf — it was tactically audacious but strategically imprudent. The stealthy intrusion by Pakistani troops has been ascribed to a lack of timely intelligence inputs. Some accounts have placed the onus of the failure on the RAW (Research and Analysis Wing). However, others contest this view but the embedded lessons from the conflict are instructive for the Modi government.
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The Vajpayee government was a caretaker one since it had lost the vote of confidence by a single vote in April 1999. However, the outcome of the war paid rich electoral dividends and the Vajpayee-led NDA was back in office later in the year. To his everlasting credit, PM Vajpayee took ownership of the lapses in Kargil and the Cabinet Committee on Security was tasked to analyse the “lessons to be learnt” – an unprecedented step for the Indian governance machinery. The detailed chronology of the decisions that followed is breathtaking.
PM Vajpayee set up a Kargil Review Committee (KRC) on July 29, 1999. The committee’s report was submitted to the government in mid-December 1999. The KRC made it clear that it was not set up to conduct an inquiry “but to examine the sequence of events and make recommendations for the future.”
Following the submission of the Report, Vajpayee constituted a Group of Ministers (GoM) on April 17, 2000, to review the national security system in its entirety. The Committee was directed to examine the KRC’s recommendations and formulate specific proposals for implementation. The GoM held its first meeting on April 27, 2000, and set up four Task Forces (TF) — on intelligence apparatus, internal security, border management and (higher) management of defence.
Domain experts from outside the government were invited to head these TFs. They included G C Saxena, N N Vohra, Madhav Godbole and Arun Singh. It is pertinent to note that the Vajpayee team had no hesitation in inviting Arun Singh, who had been a minister in the Rajiv Gandhi cabinet, to be part of the exercise in reforming the outdated national security architecture.
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All the TFs submitted their findings and recommendations by the end of September 2000 and these documents were placed before Parliament. Redacted versions were placed in the public domain. However, the Vajpayee government’s attention was diverted by other events, including 9/11 and the terrorist attack on Parliament in December 2000. The implementation of the GOM TF recommendations, therefore, remained incomplete.
It is a matter of regret that in the last two decades, India was again “surprised” by the adversary — in Mumbai in November 2008 and in Galwan in June 2020. Reviewing and reforming the Indian national security edifice – both external and internal — and making it nimbler and more effective will require time. PM Vajpayee took the first major step by investing in transparency and encouraging deliberations in Parliament – though the Congress used every opportunity to attack the government (remember George Fernandes and “Coffin Gate”?). Will PM Modi be able to complete the task begun by his illustrious predecessor in the BJP and use the same toolkit?
National security matters must not be exploited for short-term electoral gain and politicised. But that seems to be the current state of play in domestic politics. Bemoaning this trend, at Dras, PM Modi claimed that “it is not the party (BJP) but the country that is paramount for me”. In his third tenure, which will also define his legacy, Modi must lead by example. Not doing so will amount to dishonouring the sacrifices of the country’s soldiers in Kargil.
The writer is director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi
